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Part I
Introduction
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Constitutional Cases 2017:
An Overview
Lorne Sossin*

This contribution reviews the Constitutional Cases issued by the
Supreme Court in 2017. The analysis is divided into two parts. In the first
part, I analyze the year as a whole, identifying noteworthy trends.
In the second part, I explore some specific constitutional decisions of
the Court — especially those concerning issues which in my view have
important implications for the future of the Court and its constitutional
jurisprudence.

I. 2017: A YEAR IN REVIEW
2017 might best be described as a year in transition for the Supreme
Court of Canada. This year represented Chief Justice McLachlin’s last on
the Court (though cases on which she participated continued to be
released through June 2018). This year was also Justice Malcolm Rowe’s
first on the Court. The appointment of Sheilah Martin on November 29,
2017 to fill one of the “Western Canada” seats on the Court was closely
watched. While Justice Martin was widely respected as qualified for the
Court, this appointment was criticized by some as a missed opportunity
to appoint Canada’s first Indigenous Supreme Court Justice.1
The appointment of Justice Richard Wagner to assume the role of
Canada’s new Chief Justice, underscored the transitional feel to 2017.
Consequently, it was a year of reflection and taking stock of the

Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am deeply indebted to
Yadesha Satheaswaran, J.D. 2019 for her superb research and collaboration on the statistical review
of 2017 for the Constitutional Cases Conference, April 6, 2018. I am grateful to Ben Berger and
Sonia Lawrence for their assistance on this review and their leadership as conveners of the
Conference.
1
See John Geddes, “Indigenous lawyers upset over Trudeau’s Supreme Court pick”
(November 29, 2017) Macleans at: <https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/first-nations-lawyersupset-over-trudeaus-supreme-court-pick/>.
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“McLachlin Court”,2 and prognostications about what lies in store with
the “Wagner Court”, as much as it included a range of important new and
in some cases contentious Constitutional decisions.
In total, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decided 67 cases during
this calendar year. Of these 67 SCC cases, I have identified 19 as decisions
in the constitutional law field,3 including five cases which just affirmed
Court of Appeal decisions below without adding substantive reasons.4
This figure takes on significance in light of the steady decline in the
number of overall judgments from the Court (133 in 1989, the year in
which Chief Justice McLachlin was appointed to the Court, to 67 during
her last year on the Court in 2017), and the proportion of judgments
devoted to constitutional issues correspondingly rising (approximately
40 per cent in 2017).
As Canada’s Constitutional jurisprudence matures, the trend towards
fewer bold, open-ended decisions and more pragmatic, strategic
decisions appears more pronounced. This trend found expression, for
example, in a cluster of cases involving Reconciliation and the
development of Canada’s Constitution in the context of First Nations and
Indigenous Peoples, in a cluster of cases involving criminal justice
reforms and in a case involving the scope of constitutional remedies.
I will discuss these clusters and other trend-setting aspects of the
Constitutional Cases of 2017 below.

2
See, for example, Devon Kapoor, “The McLachlin Era: A Retrospective (Parts 1 & 2)”
TheCourt.ca at: <http://www.thecourt.ca/mclachlin-era-retrospective/>.
3
R. v. Boutilier, [2017] S.C.J. No. 64, 2017 SCC 64 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jones, [2017] S.C.J.
No. 60, 2017 SCC 60 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marakah, [2017] S.C.J. No. 59, 2017 SCC 59 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Marakah”]; Assn. of Justice Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] S.C.J.
No. 55, 2017 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Assn. of Justice Counsel”]; Ktunaxa Nation v. British
Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54, 2017 SCC 54
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa Nation”]; India v. Badesha, [2017] S.C.J. No. 44, 2017 SCC 44
(S.C.C.); Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 41,
2017 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chippewas of the Thames”]; Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum
Geo-Services, [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clyde River”]; R. v. Cody,
[2017] S.C.J. No. 31, 2017 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cody”]; R. v. Antic, [2017] S.C.J. No. 27,
2017 SCC 27 (S.C.C.); R. v. Paterson, [2017] S.C.J. No. 15, 2017 SCC 15 (S.C.C.); B.C. Freedom
of Information and Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2017] S.C.J. No. 6, 2017
SCC 6 (S.C.C.); Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, [2017] S.C.J. No. 1, 2017 SCC 1 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Ernst”] and First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v. Yukon, [2017] S.C.J. No. 58, 2017 SCC
58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nacho Nyak Dun”].
4
R. v. Aitkens, [2017] S.C.J. No. 14, 2017 SCC 14 (S.C.C.); R. v. Clark, [2017] S.C.J.
No. 3, 2017 SCC 3 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hunt, [2017] S.C.J. No. 25, 2017 SCC 25 (S.C.C.); Re Lajeunesse,
[2017] S.C.J. No. 24, 2017 SCC 24 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Peers, [2017] S.C.J. No. 13, 2017 SCC 13
(S.C.C.).
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Significantly, in her last year on the Court, Chief Justice McLachlin
authored the most majority decisions (four). Justice Karakatsanis also
authored or co-authored four majority reasons in 2017, suggesting her
emergence as a key centrist voice on the Court. Justices Côté and
Moldaver each authored two dissenting judgments while four justices —
Abella, Karakatsanis, McLachlin and Brown — authored or co-authored
one dissenting judgment each. In his last set of majority reasons on the
Court, Justice Thomas Cromwell (who resigned in 2016), wrote
controversial majority reasons in Ernst,5 discussed below. Marking his
first full year on the Court, Justice Rowe was not the sole author of a
single majority or dissenting opinion (though he did co-author the
majority decision in Ktunaxa Nation, and penned concurring reasons in
R. v. Jones and R. v. Marakah,6 each discussed below).
Against this backdrop of transitions and crossroads for the Supreme
Court of Canada, I explore some of the most notable cases of 2017.

II. 2017: THE YEAR, IN CASES
As noted above, the Supreme Court decided 19 cases featuring the
Constitution. The most significant activity involved developments under
sections 2 and 7 of the Charter7 and section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982.8
The analysis below is divided into three sections. First, I discuss a
cluster of cases exploring Indigenous rights under the Charter (Ktunaxa
Nation), and under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the
companion cases of Chippewas of the Thames; Clyde River and Nacho
Nyak Dun).9 Second, I examine two criminal justice cases (R. v. Cody
and R. v. Marakah),10 which each speak in very different ways to efforts
to modernize criminal justice in Canada. Third and finally, I offer
reflections on the puzzle of constitutional remedies to which the Court’s
muddled reasons in Ernst11 gives rise.

5

Supra, note 3.
Id.
7
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
8
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
9
Supra, note 3.
10
Id.
11
Id.
6
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I do not mean to suggest only these 2017 constitutional cases from the
Supreme Court of Canada merit attention. For many, the Court’s
examination of section 7 liberty rights in a labour context in Assn. of
Justice Counsel12 may well be the decision with farthest-reaching
implications.13 Others will point to the significance of the interplay
between section 7 rights, extradition and reasonableness review in India
v. Badesha14 as one of the most noteworthy.15
While I do not claim the cases discussed below are more deserving of
scrutiny, below I explore why I believe these three areas of constitutional
case law in 2017 reflect important trends or dilemmas for the future.
1. Reconciliation and the Constitution
In each of the disparate Supreme Court cases involving the Constitution
and Indigenous Peoples in 2017, the Court links its jurisprudence to the
overarching goal of Reconciliation. For example, in the opening words of
Nacho Nyak Dun,16 Karakatsanis J. stated: “As expressions of
partnership between nations, modern treaties play a critical role in
fostering reconciliation. Through section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, they have assumed a vital place in our constitutional fabric.”17
The Court reiterated a similar normative framework for the duty to
consult and accommodate in Ktunaxa Nation, Chippewas of the Thames
and Clyde River.18 That duty, first set out in detail in Haida Nation v.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests),19 is based on the following
rationale:
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came,
and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the
sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in
British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights embedded in
these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
12

Id.
See Hamish Stewart, “Assn. of Justice Counsel: The Section 7 Liberty Interest in the
Context of Employment” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 295.
14
Id.
15
For further analysis on this case, see Joanna Harrington, “Extradition, Assurances and
Human Rights: Guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada in India v. Badesha” (2019) 88
S.C.L.R. (2d) 273.
16
Supra, note 3.
17
Id., at para. 1.
18
Supra, note 3.
19
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”].
13
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The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined,
recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where
indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.

…
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and
continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a final
legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from
rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This
process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of honourable
dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de
facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of
that people. As stated in Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001
SCC 33, at para. 9, “[w]ith this assertion [sovereignty] arose an
obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, and to
protect them from exploitation” (emphasis in original).20

While Reconciliation may well be a “process” and the result of a
“partnership”, it is a conceptual framework with limits, and in 2017 the
Supreme Court affirmed the nature and scope of those limits. The thread
woven into the cluster of cases exploring Reconciliation in 2017 also
may be seen as one of judicial restraint. The Court is prepared to referee
Reconciliation procedurally, in other words, but not to intervene in order
to ensure just outcomes. These cases underscore and reflect the
procedural ascendancy which has come to characterize the McLachlin
Court more generally.21
In Nacho Nyak Dun, mentioned above, the Court considered the
implications of a modern comprehensive treaty between Yukon and First
Nations. The Court characterized the case as a judicial review of a land use
plan developed according to the terms of a treaty, and held that the
provisions of this treaty required a more collaborative process to the
management of a watershed than that engaged in by the Yukon Government.
20

Id., at paras. 25, 32.
See L. Sossin, “The Promise of Procedural Justice” in A. Dodek & D. Wright, eds., The
McLachlin Court’s First Ten Years: Reflections of the Past and Projections of the Future (Markham,
ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010), available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1911499 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1911499>.
21

7
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The dispute grew out of a process to govern the Peel Watershed in
Yukon. In 2004, the Peel Watershed Planning Commission was
established to develop a regional land use plan for the Peel Watershed.
Following an extensive process, the Commission submitted its
Recommended Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan to Yukon and the
affected First Nations. Near the end of the approval process, and after the
Commission had released a Final Recommended Plan, Yukon proposed
and adopted a final plan that made substantial changes to increase access
to and development of the region.
Justice Karakatsanis, writing for the Court, noted that in a judicial
review concerning the implementation of modern treaties, a court should
focus on the legality of the impugned decision, rather than closely
supervise the conduct of the parties at each stage of the treaty relationship.
She observes that, “Reconciliation often demands judicial forbearance”,
notwithstanding that under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
modern treaties are constitutional documents, and courts must continue to
perform an important role in safeguarding the rights they enshrine.
The Court held that while Yukon had the power to make minor
modifications to land use plans, it did not have the authority to make the
extensive changes that it made to the Final Recommended Plan for the
Peel Watershed, and that the trial judge therefore appropriately quashed
Yukon’s approval of its plan and returned the matter to a stage of further
consultation. While Yukon was not necessarily constrained in pursuing the
development projects to which the revised land use plan was directed, it
had failed to act “honourably” within the requirements of section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 in the process it undertook to finalize this plan.
Even the procedural obligations of Canadian governments affirmed in
Nacho Nyak Dun seemed uncertain in the companion cases, Chippewas
of the Thames and Clyde River.22 Haida and subsequent case law left
open to what extent and in what contexts Canadian governments could
delegate the duty to consult and accommodate to regulatory agencies,
tribunals and other arm’s length executive branch entities.
In Chippewas of the Thames, the Supreme Court addressed whether
the regulatory process established by the National Energy Board (NEB)
in relation to the approval of a pipeline project could satisfy the duty to
22
Supra, note 3. For further analysis of these cases and their implications, see Kate Glover
Berger, “Diagnosing Administrative Law: A Comment on Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames
First Nation” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 107; and Janna Promislow, “Delegation, Deference and
Difference: In Search of a Principled Approach to Implementing and Administering Aboriginal
Rights” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137.
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consult and accommodate. The NEB issued notice to Indigenous groups,
including the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, informing them of
the project, the NEB’s role, and the NEB’s upcoming hearing process.
The Chippewas were granted funding to participate in the process, and
they filed evidence and delivered oral argument delineating their
concerns that the project would increase the risk of pipeline ruptures and
spills, which could adversely impact their use of the land.
The NEB eventually approved the project, and was satisfied that
potentially affected Indigenous groups had received adequate information
and had the opportunity to share their views. The NEB also found that
potential project impacts on the rights and interests of Aboriginal groups
would likely be minimal and would be appropriately mitigated.
Writing for the Court, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. held that the
NEB’s process satisfied the duty to consult and accommodate. The Court
found that as a statutory body with the delegated executive responsibility
to make a decision that could adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty
rights, the NEB acted on behalf of the Crown in approving Enbridge’s
application. Consequently, the Crown, through the NEB, had an
obligation to consult. The Crown, in discharging its duty, may rely on
steps taken by an administrative body to fulfil its duty to consult so long
as the agency possesses the statutory powers to do what the duty to
consult requires in the particular circumstances. To discharge its
constitutional duty in this way, it must be made clear to the affected
Indigenous group that the Crown is relying on this arm’s length body’s
process, as the Court found was the case in the context of the NEB and
the Chippewas of the Thames.
The Court held further held that the duty to consult is not the
vehicle to address historical grievances. The subject of the
consultation is the impact on the claimed rights of the current decision
under consideration. Even taking the strength of the Chippewas’ claim
and the seriousness of the potential impact on the claimed rights at
their highest, the consultation undertaken in this case was clearly
“adequate” in the eyes of the Court. Potentially affected Indigenous
groups were given early notice of the NEB’s hearing and were invited
to participate in the process. The Chippewas accepted the invitation
and appeared before the NEB. They were aware that the NEB was the
final decision-maker. Moreover, they understood that no other Crown
entity was involved in the process for the purposes of carrying out
consultation. The Court concluded that the circumstances of this case
9
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made it sufficiently clear to the Chippewas that the NEB process was
intended to constitute Crown consultation and accommodation.
In the companion case, Clyde River,23 which involved similar issues
and a similar process of decision-making through the NEB, the outcome
was the opposite. The proponents in Clyde River applied to the NEB to
conduct offshore seismic testing for oil and gas in Nunavut. The
proposed testing could negatively affect the treaty rights of the Inuit of
Clyde River, who opposed the seismic testing, alleging that the duty to
consult had not been fulfilled in relation to it. The NEB granted the
requested authorization. It concluded that the proponents made sufficient
efforts to consult with Aboriginal groups and that Aboriginal groups had
an adequate opportunity to participate in the NEB’s process. The NEB
also concluded that the testing was unlikely to cause significant adverse
environmental effects.
Applying a similar test as Chippewas of the Thames, in this case, the
Court quashed the decision of the NEB as it failed to meet the standard
of adequate consultation. Once again writing for the Court, Karakatsanis
and Brown JJ. found that when affected Indigenous groups have squarely
raised concerns about Crown consultation with the NEB, the NEB must
address those concerns in reasons. In this case, the Court found that the
NEB’s inquiry was misdirected. The NEB considered environmental
impact of the proposed project, but the consultative inquiry should have
been on the Indigenous group’s section 35 rights themselves. Here, the
NEB gave no consideration to the source of the Inuit’s treaty rights, nor
to the impact of the proposed testing on those rights. Second, although
the Crown relied on the processes of the NEB as fulfilling its duty to
consult, that was not made clear to the Inuit. Finally, the NEB made
available only limited opportunities for participation and consultation by
Inuit groups (for example, there were no oral hearings and there was no
participant funding, as in the Chippewas of the Thames).
While the Court’s decision in Clyde River represented a significant
victory for the appellants in the case, which should not be minimized,
this judgment along with the Chippewas of the Thames, arguably
represents a step backwards (or at least sideways) in the journey toward
Reconciliation. Emerging from the Crown’s fiduciary obligations and the
Honour of the Crown, the duty to consult and accommodate was
elaborated in Haida Nation (and the companion case Taku River Tlingit

23

Supra, note 3.
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First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director))24 as a
hopeful initiative to ensure section 35 rights were top of mind as the
Crown makes decisions affecting territories subject to Indigenous
claims.25 In light of these most recent decisions, it appears that the
Crown need not design processes with Indigenous rights in mind at all —
rather, as long as existing statutory bodies such as the NEB have
mandates to consult, and the Crown provides notice to affected
Indigenous groups that consultations by the arm’s length body will
constitute the Crown’s consultation, the Crown can rely on such bodies
to discharge their constitutional duties, even where these bodies do no
more than permit Indigenous groups to participate on similar terms to all
other “stakeholders”. In other words, the duty to consult and
accommodate under section 35 is fast becoming just another version of
procedural fairness, and the Court seems to have retrenched from the
initial position expressed by McLachlin C.J.C. in Haida Nation that
“[t]he honour of the Crown cannot be delegated.”26
The aspirations of Reconciliation suffered another setback in Ktunaxa
Nation.27 This decision involved a challenge to a proposed ski resort
development in the traditional territories of the Ktunaxa First Nation in
British Columbia (a place known as Qat’muk, which has spiritual
significance as home to Grizzly Bear Spirit, a principal spirit within
Ktunaxa religious beliefs and cosmology).
The Ktunaxa were consulted about this proposed development and
raised concerns about the impact of the project, which led to some
modifications to the proposal and additional consultations. After these
further consultations, the Ktunaxa adopted the position that
accommodation was impossible because the project would drive Grizzly
Bear Spirit from Qat’muk and therefore irrevocably impair their religious
beliefs and practices. The British Columbia Government declared that
reasonable consultation had occurred and approved the project.
Writing for a majority of the Court, McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J.
held that the Minister’s decision did not violate the Ktunaxa’s section
2(a) Charter right to freedom of religion, as their concern was an
“object” of belief, not the Ktunaxa’s freedom to hold their beliefs or their
freedom to manifest those beliefs. This aspect of the judgment is
24

[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River”].
See, for example, Dwight Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with
Aboriginal Peoples (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).
26
Haida Nation, supra, note 19, at para. 53.
27
Supra, note 3.
25
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discussed elsewhere in this volume,28 but suffice it to say that the
juxtaposition between the “freedom” to believe and the “objects” of that
belief flows from an expressly non-Indigenous approach to spirituality,
as opposed to an approach attempting to “reconcile” Western and
Indigenous spiritual approaches or between Western and Indigenous law.
Beyond the religious freedom aspect of the decision, the Court also
considered the Minister’s decision that the Crown had met its duty to
consult and accommodate under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The Court noted that the Minister’s decision to approve a project for
development is entitled to deference. A court reviewing an administrative
decision under section 35 does not decide the constitutional issue de novo
raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, and therefore does not
decide the issue for itself.29 Rather, in a blend of administrative law and
constitutional law standards, the court must ask whether the decisionmaker’s finding on the issue (that is, that the Crown’s duty to consult and
accommodate was met in these circumstances) was reasonable.
Framed in this way, the Court need only conclude that the Minister’s
determination that the consultation and accommodation was adequate
represented one of the possible findings which could be made in these
circumstances, not that it was the correct or appropriate finding. The Court
further noted that Aboriginal rights must be proven by “tested evidence”;
they cannot be established as an incident of administrative law proceedings
that centre on the adequacy of consultation and accommodation. In other
words, the subject matter of this was whether the consultations were
adequate, not whether the impact on the affected Indigenous community
justified objecting to the project. For McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J.,
“consultation and accommodation” will not resolve underlying claims, but
rather constitute the best available legal tool. They observe:
The Ktunaxa reply that they must have relief now, for if development
proceeds Grizzly Bear Spirit will flee Qat’muk long before they are
able to prove their claim or establish it under the B.C. treaty process.
We are not insensible to this point. But the solution is not for courts to
make far-reaching constitutional declarations in the course of judicial
review proceedings incidental to, and ill-equipped to determine,
Aboriginal rights and title claims. Injunctive relief to delay the project
may be available. Otherwise, the best that can be achieved in the

28
See Howard Kislowicz & Senwung Luk, “Recontextualizing Ktunaxa Nation v. British
Columbia: Crown Land, History and Indigenous Religious Freedom” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205.
29
Ktunaxa Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 82.
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uncertain interim while claims are resolved is to follow a fair and
respectful process and work in good faith toward reconciliation. Claims
should be identified early in the process and defined as clearly as
possible. In most cases, this will lead to agreement and reconciliation.
Where it does not, mitigating potential adverse impacts on the asserted
right ultimately requires resolving questions about the existence and
scope of unsettled claims as expeditiously as possible. For the Ktunaxa,
this may seem unsatisfactory, indeed tragic. But in the difficult period
between claim assertion and claim resolution, consultation and
accommodation, imperfect as they may be, are the best available legal
tools in the reconciliation basket.30

Thus framed, the Court held that the record in Ktunaxa Nation
supported the reasonableness of the Minister’s conclusion that the section
35 obligation of consultation and accommodation had been met.
Ktunaxa Nation reveals the limits of a framework of consultation and
accommodation. Ultimately, where a First Nation or Indigenous
community is simply opposed to a project, as here, the framework tends
to favour the Crown as long as it demonstrates that it appreciates the
objections and makes some modifications to the project in light of the
objection. The Court concluded in this context, for example, that while
the Minister did not offer the ultimate accommodation demanded by the
Ktunaxa — complete rejection of the ski resort project — the Crown met
its obligation to consult and accommodate by modifying the proposal. As
the Court expressly notes, section 35 guarantees a process, not a
particular result or a veto, and that where adequate consultation has
occurred, a development may proceed without consent.
The dissonance between the duty to consult and accommodate
framework as articulated in Ktunaxa Nation and the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”),31 and its
emphasis on “free, prior and informed” consent by Indigenous Peoples
with respect to use of their territory, is striking.
The increasingly procedural approach to section 35 in the cases
discussed above, also shows the conceptual and practical limits of the
Court’s embrace of Reconciliation. In the view of the Supreme Court,
the goal of Reconciliation remains how to address “Aboriginal rights” in
the context of Canadian law and Crown sovereignty. In the eyes of many
First Nations and Indigenous Peoples, however, Reconciliation must in
30

Id., at para. 86.
A/RES/61/295(September 13, 2007), online: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/
indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html>.
31
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the end address Indigenous laws and sovereignty as well. It remains
unclear whether the section 35 jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (or
whether the Supreme Court as an institution itself rooted in Canadian
claims to sovereignty) is up to the challenge of Reconciliation conceived
in this way.32
Just as the Court has confronted the crossroads of Reconciliation, it
also found itself grappling with transformational change in the criminal
justice system as well. It is to that sphere that my analysis now turns.
2. Criminal Justice Reform and Frameworks for the Future
The future of Canada’s criminal justice system remained very much a
theme in the Supreme Court in 2017, particularly in R. v. Marakah and R.
v. Cody.33 These cases engage with the future in very different contexts.
In Marakah,34 the Court considered the narrow question of whether
text messages are subject to privacy rights in relation to section 8 of the
Charter and the protection against unreasonable search and seizure.35
More broadly, the Court in this case continued its consideration of how
criminal law and constitutional principles might adapt to the digital age.
Marakah addressed the issue of whether text messages received on one
phone could be used against the sender of the texts on another phone.
The Court held that text messages sent and received may attract a
reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore can be protected against
unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter. Whether a
claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of a
particular text message must be assessed in the totality of the
circumstances. To claim section 8 protection, claimants must establish
that they had an objectively reasonable, subjective expectation of
privacy in the messages at issue. The Court identified a number of
factors that may be considered in this analysis, including: (1) the place
where the search occurred whether it be a real physical place or a
metaphorical chat room; (2) the private nature of the subject matter, that
32

Increasingly, First Nations and Indigenous communities in Canada are turning to
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is whether the informational content of the electronic conversation
revealed details of the claimant’s lifestyle or information of a biographic
nature; and (3) control over the subject matter.
In this case, applying this existing framework, the Court held that
Marakah had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages
recovered from the iPhone of his accomplice “W”, the recipient of the
messages (the same messages obtained from Marakah’s phone were
deemed inadmissible based on an invalid search). In the Court’s view,
Marakah’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.
Each of the three factors relevant to objective reasonableness in this case
support this conclusion. If the place of the search is viewed as a private
electronic space accessible by only Marakah and his accomplice,
Marakah’s reasonable expectation of privacy is clear.
It is clear that much of the Court’s analysis of the Charter turns on its
understanding of the technology and social context involved in text
messaging. In the course of her analysis, the Chief Justice attempts to set
out the “technical reality of text messaging”:
Correctly characterized, the subject matter of the search was
Mr. Marakah’s “electronic conversation” with Mr. Winchester: see R. v.
TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 5,
per Abella J. To describe text messages as part of an electronic
conversation is to take a holistic view of the subject matter of the search.
This properly avoids a mechanical approach that defines the subject matter
in terms of physical acts, spaces, or modalities of transmission: see
Spencer, at paras. 26 and 31. It also reflects the technological reality of text
messaging.
“Text messaging” refers to the electronic communications medium
technically known as Short Message Service (“SMS”). SMS uses
standardized communication protocols and mobile telephone service
networks to transmit short text messages from one mobile phone to
another: TELUS, at para. 111, per Cromwell J., dissenting but not on
this point. Colloquially, however, “text messaging” (or the verb “to
text”) can also describe various other person-to-person electronic
communications tools, such as Apple iMessage, Google Hangouts, and
BlackBerry Messenger. These means of nearly instant communication
are both technologically distinct from and functionally equivalent to
SMS. Different service providers also handle SMS messages
differently. The data that constitute individual SMS or other text
messages may exist in different places at different times. They may be
transmitted, stored, and accessed in different ways. But the
15
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interconnected system in which they all participate functions to permit
rapid communication of short messages between individuals. In these
reasons, I use “text messages” to refer to the broader category of
electronic communications media, and “SMS” or “SMS messages” to
refer to that medium specifically.36

Chief Justice McLachlin quotes approvingly from Abella J.’s caution
in TELUS that, “[t]echnical differences inherent in new technology
should not determine the scope of protection afforded to private
communications.”37 For McLachlin C.J.C., the takeaway is that the
subject matter of the search is the conversation, “not its components”.38
Because, for the majority, the section 8 Charter right shifts with the
subjective expectations of the individual, it will evolve along with the
digital transformation in our society, in which that subjective experience
may be harder and harder to disentangle from machine learning, artificial
intelligence and “augmented reality”. With each new technological leap,
the social implications for our understanding of “privacy” are profound.
Indeed, the Chief Justice explores the social context of this mode of
communication in vivid detail:
One can even text privately in plain sight. A wife has no way of
knowing that, when her husband appears to be catching up on emails,
he is in fact conversing by text message with a paramour. A father does
not know whom or what his daughter is texting at the dinner table.
Electronic conversations can allow people to communicate details
about their activities, their relationships, and even their identities that
they would never reveal to the world at large, and to enjoy portable
privacy in doing so.39

In these circumstances, McLachlin C.J.C. reasoned that if the place of
the search is viewed as Marakah’s accomplice’s phone, this reduces, but
does not negate Marakah’s expectation of privacy over texts he sent to
his accomplice. The mere fact of the electronic conversation between the
two men tended to reveal personal information about the criminal
enterprise in which they were participating (an illegal transaction of
firearms). In addition, Marakah exercised control over the informational
content of the electronic conversation, which is not negated by the reality

36
37
38
39

Marakah, supra, note 3, at paras. 17-18.
R. v. TELUS Communications Co., [2013] S.C.J. No. 16, 2013 SCC 16, at para. 5 (S.C.C.).
Marakah, supra, note 3, at para. 19.
Id., at para. 36.

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2017

17

that the accomplice could have revealed the contents of the text of his
own accord had he chosen to do so. Therefore, in the majority’s view,
Marakah had standing to challenge the search and the admission of the
evidence of the text messages recovered from the accomplice’s iPhone.
Chief Justice McLachlin concludes that there is nothing in the record to
suggest that the justice system cannot adapt to the challenges of
recognizing that some electronic conversations may engage section 8 of
the Charter. Without the erroneously admitted evidence obtained from his
accomplice’s iPhone, the majority accepted that Marakah would have
been acquitted and that to allow that conviction to stand would be a
miscarriage of justice.
Justice Moldaver issued a strong dissenting view in Marakah, joined
by Côté J., asserting that Marakah lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the text message on the phone of his accomplice. Further
Moldaver J. expressed the concern that the majority’s approach would
dramatically expand the scope of section 8 Charter coverage.
Justice Rowe, in one of his first interventions, offered a concurring
judgment focusing more specifically on the implications of technological
change to constitutional standards. He noted that the speed at which
digital communications such as texting may be shared make it
fundamentally different than physical letters, to which it is often
analogized in the courts.
The Supreme Court majority’s holding in Marakah did not signal a
fundamental shift in section 8 of the Charter in light of digital
transformations, but we may well look back at how the Court wrestled
with text messaging as a shot across the bow. The question this case
raises is whether our existing frameworks for Charter protections in the
criminal justice system are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to keep up
with new digital forms of communication and interaction, or whether
new frameworks are needed. Already, lower courts in the United States
are grappling with expectations of privacy over communications with or
facilitated by artificial intelligence, such as Amazon’s “Echo” product.40
For now, the majority of the Court, led by the departing Chief Justice,
have doubled down on reliance on the elasticity of the frameworks we

40
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have. At some point soon, however, those frameworks themselves may
need to be revisited.41
An example of where the Court has opted for a new framework to
confront future challenges is R. v. Cody,42 a follow-up judgment to its
landmark decision in R. v. Jordan43 establishing new guidelines for
managing delay and a new test for applying the section 11(d) Charter
right to trial within a reasonable period in the criminal justice system.
Cody involved a criminal prosecution for drugs and weapons offences
commenced in January 12, 2010, where the trial was scheduled to
conclude on January 30, 2015. Before the commencement of his trial,
Cody brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a
stay of proceedings due to the delay, and while this pre-dated the new
framework developed by the Court in Jordan, the Court of Appeal
remitted the matter for trial after an application of the Jordan framework,
and so Cody represented the first opportunity for the Court to reflect on
the application of Jordan.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal, in Cody, the Supreme Court, writing
per curiam (signalling its unity and commitment), concluded that the
five-year delay in Cody was unreasonable within the Jordan framework.
More broadly, the Court signalled that the significant disruptions across
the country (stays of criminal proceedings, policy initiatives to restrict
preliminary inquiries and other contentious reforms) would not deter or
distract the Court from its commitment to reform to reduce delay in the
criminal justice system.
The Jordan framework establishes presumptive constitutional ceilings
for the time a criminal prosecution may take — 18 months for cases tried
in provincial courts and 30 months for cases tried in superior courts.44
Under the Jordan framework, after the total delay from the charge to the
actual or anticipated end of trial is calculated, delay attributable to the
defence is subtracted. That defence delay is further divided into two
components: delay waived by the defence and delay caused by defence
conduct, and these delays “count” against the total period of the delay.

41
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And, to determine this amount, the Court must also consider delay solely
or directly caused by the accused person which flows from defence
action that is illegitimate. Illegitimacy in this sense relates not to ethical
misconduct (necessarily) but rather in the sense of the “culture change”
to which the Jordan framework was aimed. The Court acknowledges in
Cody that defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure,
and both may attract scrutiny.
The Court stressed that beyond a retrospective accounting of delay, a
proactive approach is required from all participants in the justice system
to prevent and minimize delay. Trial judges should suggest ways to
improve efficiency, use their case management powers and not hesitate to
summarily dismiss applications and requests the moment it becomes
apparent they are frivolous.
The Court in Cody affirmed that after defence delay has been
deducted, the net delay must be compared to the applicable
presumptive ceiling set out in Jordan. Transitional considerations may
be taken into account as a form of exceptional circumstances where, as
here, the case was already in the system when Jordan was decided. The
Court notes that in Cody, the total delay was approximately 60.5
months, from which the delay waived by C should be deducted (13
months). After accounting for the other defence related delays, the total
delay is 44 months, which far exceeds the 30-month ceiling set out in
Jordan and therefore, was presumptively unreasonable, and Cody was
entitled to the stay he sought.
Marakah and Cody involve different criminal justice issues,
different Charter rights, and different facts and circumstances. Each
highlights a distinct approach as to how the Supreme Court envisions
the evolution of the criminal justice system. In Marakah, the majority
of the Court kept adapted frameworks to the dynamics of new
technology in the determination of an accused’s expectation of privacy
for purposes of section 8 of the Charter. In Cody, the Court confirmed
its new framework for determining delay under section 11(d) of the
Charter. In both cases, the Court assumed its own leadership with
respect to how criminal justice would confront the future. In civil
contexts, however, the Court has taken a notably different approach to
the evolution of constitutional norms, one apparently premised on
deference to legislative choices. I discuss this dynamic below in
context of Charter damages, to which I now turn.
19
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3. Statutory Bars to Constitutional Remedies: The Importance of
Being Ernst
In Ernst,45 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the availability of
Charter damages in the face of a statutory bar to civil litigation against a
public regulator. In this third area of focus among the constitutional cases of
2017, I consider the Court’s rationale in Ernst for upholding this statutory
bar and the implications of the Court’s analysis for a coherent relationship
between statutory and constitutional interpretation in Canada.46
The case arose in the context of a property owner, Jessica Ernst, who
was seeking various remedies against private and public parties she
believed to be responsible for harm to her property as a result of fracking
activities. One of the defendants in her claim was the Alberta Energy
Regulator (“AER”), a statutory, quasi-independent energy regulator.
Among other grounds for relief, Ernst alleged she was “punished” by the
AER for publicly criticizing it and that she was prevented by the AER
from speaking out for a period of 16 months. Ernst claimed that her
section 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression was breached, and
that Charter damages should be available to remedy that breach. As this
case arises from a motion to strike her claim based on pleadings, all the
facts alleged by Ernst had to be accepted by the court as true.
Section 43 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act (the “Act”),47
the statute that governs the AER, immunizes it from civil claims for
actions it takes pursuant to its statutory authority. Both the Alberta Court
of Queen’s Bench and the Alberta Court of Appeal found that the
immunity clause on its face bars Ernst’s claim for Charter damages and
concluded therefore that her claim against the Board should be struck
out. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, for the first time, she
added to her claim a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 43
of the Act. The immunity clause at issue reads:
No action or proceeding may be brought against the Board or a member
of the Board or a person referred to in section 10 or 17(1) in respect of
any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance of this Act, or any Act
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that the Board administers, the regulations under any of those Acts or a
decision, order or direction of the Board.48

The majority judgment (authored by Cromwell J. in one of his final
judgments), concludes that since Ernst herself acknowledged the
statutory bar precluded her claim for Charter damages (and therefore
should be struck down), and no authorities were offered in support of the
view that the statutory bar did not preclude that claim, then the Supreme
Court of Canada had to proceed on that basis. Justice Cromwell
separately concluded that even if a Charter damages claim were
permitted, however, such a claim would fail in these circumstances
because of the countervailing factors against the awarding of Charter
damages as recognized in Vancouver (City) v. Ward.49
In Ward, the Court set out a framework for the Charter damages
claims under section 24(1), under which the claimant must demonstrate
that her or his Charter rights had been breached and that damages would
serve as compensation, vindication, or deterrence. Once that burden is
met, the state has the onus to demonstrate that damages should not be
awarded based on countervailing considerations (such as the availability
of alternative remedies and good governance arguments).
The majority’s view that it must accept the statutory bar precluding a
claim to Charter damages because the claimant seems to accept this
premise unduly fetters the discretion of the Court. If the proper
understanding of a Charter doctrine has not been advanced by the parties,
this does not mean the Court must accept an improper understanding, as
the Court itself has acknowledged in the past.50 It is always open to the
Court to reach a conclusion on a question of constitutional interpretation
even if it differs from the position advanced by the parties or where the
parties have chosen for their own reasons not to advance that argument.
For reasons set out below, in my view, the premise the Supreme Court of
Canada accepts in Ernst, that a statutory immunity clause can in any
circumstances bar a Charter claim, is suspect.
The majority’s discussion of countervailing factors is also
unpersuasive. The existence of countervailing factors, as set out above,
only arises where a party’s entitlement to Charter damages has been
48
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established and where the Crown seeks to demonstrate that damages
nonetheless should not be awarded.
First, a preliminary motion to strike Ernst’s claim against the AER
because of the statutory bar to Charter damages should not depend on
whether she has a strong or weak case to actually establish her
entitlement to damages, nor on whether the Crown has or does not have
grounds to raise countervailing factors. In other words, either her Charter
claim is barred (in which case the analysis of countervailing factors is
irrelevant), or it is not barred (in which case the analysis of
countervailing factors is premature).
Second, the existence of countervailing factors in this case is not
compelling. The majority asserts that because judicial review is available
on administrative law grounds, this alternative remedy militates against
the availability of Charter damages. The effect of the majority finding is
that while a common law remedy (judicial review) cannot be barred by
statute, a constitutional remedy (Charter damages) can be. This finding is
puzzling. Statutes always must be interpreted in ways that safeguard, not
inhibit, the protection of Charter rights and freedoms.
The countervailing good governance concerns also fall flat. Justice
Cromwell notes that the Board must be free from the anxiety of constant
litigation in pursuing its statutory goals. While this might be relevant
where a claim relates to someone aggrieved by the regulatory actions of a
regulator, Ernst involves a regulator engaging in alleged punitive
behaviour in an attempt to silence a complainant. A suit for Charter
damages is not the same as a suit for civil damages, and the Supreme
Court of Canada’s desire to frame the former as a species of the latter
(rather than as part of the spectrum of remedies for Charter breaches per
se) leads the majority of the Court, in my view, down a problematic path.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on cases involving the
high bar for negligence claims against public regulators — Cromwell J.
observes, “[w]hile, as noted, Charter damages are an autonomous
remedy, and every state actor has an obligation to be Charter-compliant,
the same policy considerations as are present in the law of negligence
nonetheless weigh heavily here .…”51
The second point in this passage simply does not follow from the
first. If Charter damages represent an autonomous remedy, and if every
state actor has an obligation to be Charter-compliant, then the case law
relating to negligence against state agencies sheds little if any light on the
51
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issue (just as the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Henry v.
British Columbia (Attorney General),52 held that the tort of malicious
prosecution did not shed light on the test appropriate for Charter
damages claims against Crown prosecutors). The search for remedies
that are “just and appropriate” under section 24 of the Charter is
fundamentally distinct from the search for a duty of care and breach
under the common law tort of negligence.
The dissenting group of four justices, led by McLachlin C.J.C. and
Moldaver and Brown JJ. (Côté J. concurring), conclude that Ernst’s
claim should not be struck, as it was not plain and obvious that Charter
damages could in no circumstances be an appropriate and just remedy in
a claim against the Board. Further, they concluded it is not plain and
obvious that Ernst’s claim is barred by section 43. The dissenting justices
come to a more sound conclusion, but their reasoning is also based on a
faulty premise. They stated:
In deciding whether a claim for Charter damages should be struck out
on the basis of a statutory immunity clause, the court must first
determine whether it is plain and obvious that Charter damages could
not be an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances of the
plaintiff’s claim.53

By suggesting that the merits of the Charter damages have to be
assessed before considering the scope of the statutory immunity clause,
the dissenting justices, like the majority, seem to put the statutory cart
before the constitutional horse. It is entirely possible that Charter
damages are not warranted in the circumstances of this case (though it is
uncertain on what grounds the Court could reach such a determination
while also accepting all the facts as pleaded by the claimant as true), but
that analysis has little to do with whether a statutory bar can preclude a
section 24 Charter remedy. The issue in the appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada was the scope of the statutory immunity clause, not the
strength of the claim to Charter damages.
In my view, the answer to the question regarding the statutory
immunity clause raised in this case is far simpler than the approach taken
by the majority or dissenting justices. An immunity clause can preclude
only those claims that a legislature has the constitutional authority to bar
— that includes civil claims for damages, but it cannot bar Charter
52
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claims (including Charter claims, as in Ernst, where one of the remedies
sought is Charter damages). On this reading, the Supreme Court of
Canada could and should have interpreted the statutory bar as
inapplicable to this claim to the extent a breach of the Charter is properly
pleaded. Further, to Abella J.’s objection in her concurring reasons, the
Alberta Government would not need to have received formal notice of
the claim, since the validity of the statutory immunity clause does not
arise as a live issue if it is interpreted as inapplicable to Charter claims.
Returning to my broader objection with the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s approach to Charter damages, the claim in this case,
on its face, is that a Charter breach has occurred. Ernst claims she was
silenced as punishment for her opposition to the Board. The availability
of Charter damages, like the availability of other Charter remedies
(declarations, injunctions, etc.), cannot be precluded by an act either of a
provincial legislature or of Parliament (unless the notwithstanding clause
under section 33 is invoked, which is the sole mechanism for
immunizing public bodies from Charter scrutiny, and therefore, from
Charter remedies). Legislation can limit the availability of Charter
remedies from administrative tribunals and regulators as they have no
inherent powers, and so can only provide those constitutional remedies
which fall within their statutory jurisdiction,54 but here, the remedy
sought is from a court.
In my view, the Court in Ernst misconstrues the place of Charter
damages in the context of Canada’s constitutional architecture. It is
important to recall what is at issue in Ernst. The case is not about
whether the Charter was breached, or, if so, whether Charter damages are
appropriate — rather, this case is about whether a claimant should have a
chance to prove her allegations of a Charter breach warranting damages
as a remedy, and whether a statute can bar her from having such an
opportunity. By upholding the validity of a statute to bar a Charter
remedy, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed a legislature to
unilaterally circumscribe constitutional protections and done so for no
broader constitutional rationales or benefits.

III. CONCLUSION
The constitutional cases of 2017 may well be overshadowed by the
significant transitions which occurred during this eventful year, and in
54
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particular, the retirement of Chief Justice McLachlin. She will, I think, be
remembered for her remarkable energy and productivity, her gift for
consensus-building on the Court, her courage in the face of the criticism
from Prime Minister Harper in 2014 as part of the fallout from the
invalidated appointment of Justice Marc Nadon, and her growing
commitment, particularly as Chief Justice, to the field of Reconciliation
with First Nation and Indigenous Peoples.
That said, the Supreme Court’s constitutional cases of 2017 merit
scrutiny for several reasons. As set out in the analysis above, I believe
this year will be seen as a setback in the journey toward Reconciliation,
on the basis of Chippewas of the Thames, Clyde River and Ktunaxa
Nation. I believe this year highlights the tensions in the Court’s role in
criminal justice reform between adapting existing frameworks to meet
future challenges, such as the digital transformation touched upon in
Marakah, or developing new frameworks, such the Jordan framework,
applied to the administrative and advocacy hurdles to reduce delay in
Cody. Finally, I believe Ernst will be remembered as a problematic
precedent in working out the relationship between statutory interpretation
on the one hand, and the requirements of the Constitution on the other.
For all of these reasons, in the context of the Supreme Court of
Canada and the Constitution, 2017 was a year to remember!
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